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11 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a new kind of monotonic
allocation schemes for special cooperative games, where there are players
of diﬀerent types. Other sort of monotonic allocation rules are introduced
earlier by Sprumont (1990) and by Brˆ anzei et al. (2001). Sprumont considers
for the subclass of totally balanced games population monotonic allocation
schemes (pmas). Such a pmas is a rule which assigns to the game and to all
subgames a core element in such a way that the payoﬀ of a player in a core
element assigned to a smaller subgame is not larger than in a larger subgame.
Sprumont proves that for each convex game a pmas exists, that each core
element is pmas-extendable and that the application of the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953) to all the subgames results also in a pmas. In Brˆ anzei et al.
(2001) bi-monotonic allocation schemes (bi-mas) are introduced for the cone
of total big boss games (cf. Muto et al., 1988), which are schemes assigning
simultaneously to such a game and to those subgames which contain the
big boss a core element, in such a way that in the core elements of smaller
coalitions the big boss is not better oﬀ and the other players are not worse
oﬀ than in a larger coalition. Here the τ-value (Tijs, 1981) applied to the
(non-trivial) subgames results in a bi-mas. Furthermore, each core element
is bi-mas extendable. Extensions of bi-mas to clan games are studied in
Voorneveld et al. (2000). Another kind of monotonic allocation schemes for
sequencing situations, namely drop out monotonic allocation schemes, are
introduced in Fern´ andez et al. (2001).
In this paper we consider multi-glove markets and the corresponding
cooperative games. For these multi-glove games we introduce type monotonic
allocation schemes (tmas), tackle the question of the existence of tmas and
of the possibility of extensions of core elements to tmas.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce multi-
glove markets (mg-markets), where there are agents of diﬀerent types each
with a type speciﬁc good. Then allocation rules for such markets are consid-
ered; special attention is paid to the interesting class of weighted allocation
rules, which are based on hierarchical weight systems on the type space. In
Section 3 multi-glove games (mg-games) corresponding to mg-markets are
studied. For these kind of cooperative games we describe the imputation
set, the core, the τ-value, and the nucleolus. The τ-value and the nucleolus
coincide, and these point-valued solutions turn out to be in the barycenter of
2the core of such a game. In Section 4 the notion of type monotonic allocation
scheme (tmas) for mg-games is introduced. Each weighted allocation rule for
mg-markets generates for each mg-game a tmas and all core elements of an
mg-game can be extended to a tmas. The τ-value (or the nucleolus) applied
to games and subgames turns out to generate also a tmas.
2 Multi-glove markets and allocation rules
In this section we consider well–known special markets in which t diﬀerent
types of goods 1,2,...,t (t ≥ 2) are available and where each agent in the
market possesses precisely one unit of one of the present goods; moreover, for
each type of goods there is at least one owner. Further a proﬁt of one unit
can be obtained only if one unit of each of the t types of goods are combined.
The agents in the market with one unit of good s are called agents of type
s and this set of agents is denoted by Ns. Then N1,N2,...,Nt is a partition
of the set N of all agents in the market. Let us denote the set of types
{1,2,...,t} with T and let us denote by ns the number of agents in Ns. Then
the agents in N can make a proﬁt of min
s∈T ns units. We will denote such a
market with mT :=< T,N1,N2,...,Nt > and, in situations where only the
number of agents of the diﬀerent types matters, we also denote the market by
n = (n1,n2,...,nt). If there are only two types (t = 2) such a market is called
a glove market, where the agents of type 1 (type 2) possess a left (right) glove
and where a left–right pair of gloves has value 1. Inspired by this name we
call our markets multi-glove markets or mg-markets (although a nice name for
t = 4 could be horse shoe markets). For relevant related literature we refer
to Shapley (1959), Shapley and Shubik (1969), Owen (1975), Rosenm¨ uller
and Sudh¨ olter (2000), and Apartsin and Holzman (2000).
We are interested in eﬃcient and symmetric allocation rules, which di-
vide for each market < T,N1,N2,...,Nt > the total proﬁt p(n) := min
s∈T ns
among the agents in such a way that agents of the same type get the same




+, where IN = {1,2,...} is the set of natural numbers, and where
for each market n = (n1,n2,...,nt) ∈ IN
t and for each s ∈ T the share of the




u∈T nu = p(n).
In the following we denote the set of scarce types of the market n by
3sc(n), so sc(n) = {s ∈ T | ns = p(n)} = argmin
u∈T nu.
Example 1. The allocation rule F : IN
t → IR
t
+ deﬁned by Fs(n) =
t−1n−1
s p(n) for each s ∈ T, divides the proﬁt in such a way that the to-
tal share of each of the types is the same amount t−1p(n). Here F assigns
also to non–scarce agents a positive payoﬀ.
Example 2. Let E : IN
t → IR
t
+ be such that for each mg-market n,
Es(n) = 0 if s / ∈ sc(n), and Es(n) = |sc(n)|−1 otherwise. Then E divides
the proﬁt equally among the scarce members.
We introduce now a special class of allocation rules induced by hierar-
chical weight systems. A (hierarchical) weight system for multi-glove markets
with type space T = {1,2,...,t} is determined by a partition {C1,C2,...,Ck}
of T in classes of types and corresponding vectors w1,w2,...,wk in IR
t
+, where
for each r ∈ {1,2,...,k} the carrier carr(wr) = {s ∈ T | wr
s > 0} of wr is





s = 1. We will denote such a weight system by
(w1,w2,...,wk) or shortly w. The class Cr is called the class of types of rank
r and the vector wr is called the weight vector for this class.
Given (w1,w2,...,wk) the induced allocation rule F w = F (w1,w2,...,wk)
divides the total proﬁt in an mg-market n ∈ IN
t among the agents which
belong to those scarce types which have the lowest rank, and the distribution
of the proﬁt for these types is determined by the corresponding weight vector.













if s ∈ sc(n) ∩ C`(n), and F (w1,w2,...,wk)
s (n) = 0 otherwise.

































because sc(6,4,4,4,4) = {2,3,4,5} and `(6,4,4,4,4) = 1. Further
F
(w1,w2)(6,4,4,3,4) = (0,0,0,1,0).
4Note that the rule E : IN
t → IR
t
+ from Example 2 is also a rule based
on a hierarchical weight system with only one class C1 = T and w1 =
|T|−1(1,1,...,1); so E = F w1.
Let us now introduce for allocation rules two properties: the scarcety
property scarce and the ratio consistency property cons. These properties
hold for rules based on hierarchical weight systems.
In fact, these properties turn out to be characterizing for such rules as
we see in Theorem 1.
We say that F : IN
t → IR
t
+ satisﬁes scarce if Fs(n) = 0 for each
mg-market n ∈ IN
t and each s / ∈ sc(n).
Clearly, each F w satisﬁes scarce. The rule F in Example 1 does not
satisfy scarce.
We say that F : IN
t → IR
t
+ satisﬁes cons if for all pairs n,m ∈ IN
t, for






for all u ∈ T. (1)
This implies, for example, that for two types s,u ∈ T with positive shares
in both mg-markets n and m w.r.t. the rule F, if s gets α times the amount
which u gets in mg-market n, then this is also (consistently) the case in
mg-market m.
Take F w = F (w1,w2,...,wk) and mg-markets n,m for which there is an s ∈ T
such that F w
s (n) > 0 and F w
s (m) > 0. Then s is scarce in n as well as in m,
and if s ∈ Cr then `(n) = `(m) = r. So F w
u (m) = F w
u (n) = 0 if u / ∈ Cr and
















Theorem 1 (Characterization of rules based on weight systems). An
allocation rule F : IN
t → IR
t
+ satisﬁes scarce and cons if and only if there
are a k ∈ IN and a weight system w = (w1,w2,...,wk) such that F = F w.
Proof. We have already shown that a rule of the form F w satisﬁes scarce
and cons. Conversely, let F be a rule with the scarce and cons pro-
perties. We construct a weight system w as follows. Take the mg-market n1 =
5(1,1,...,1), where all types are scarce and take w1 = F(n1). If carr(w1) = T,
take w = (w1). If carr(w1) 6= T, take an mg-market n2 with n2
s = 2 if
s ∈ carr(w1) and n2
s = 1 otherwise. Then sc(n2) = T \ carr(w1) and take
w2 = F(n2). If carr(w1) ∪ carr(w2) = T, then take w = (w1,w2). Otherwise
take w3 = F(n3) where n3
s = 2 for s ∈ carr(w1) ∪ carr(w2) and n3
s = 1
otherwise. And so we go on.





h) for all h ∈ {1,2,...,k}. (2)
It remains to prove that F(n) = F w(n) for all n ∈ IN
t.
Take n ∈ IN
t. Take among the scarce types in n a type s with Fs(n) > 0
and such that there is no s0 with Fs0(n) > 0, which is in a lower class w.r.t.
the hierarchy corresponding to w. Let s ∈ Ch. Then the mg-markets n and

































s (n)=1, we obtain α=1. Hence F =F w.2
The next theorem will be useful in Section 4.
Theorem 2 (Type monotonicity for allocation rules based on weight
systems). Let w = (w1,w2,...,wk) be a hierarchical weight system. Let
n ∈ IN
t and u ∈ T with nu ≥ 2. Then
F
w





s (n − e
u) ≤ F
w
s (n) for s ∈ T \ {u}. (3)
(Here (n−eu) = (n1,n2,...,nu −1,...,nt), eu is the u-th basis vector in IR
t.)
Interpretation. If gains in mg-markets are distributed using an allocation
rule based on weight systems, and in an mg-market one player of a certain
6type leaves, then in the new mg-market the remaining agents of the same
type are not worse oﬀ, while agents of other types are not better oﬀ.
Proof of Theorem 2. We consider three cases, where the third case consists
of three subcases.
(i) Suppose u ∈ sc(n). Then sc(n − eu) = {u}, so
F
w
u (n − e




s (n − e
u) = 0 ≤ F
w
s (n) for s ∈ T \ {u}.
Hence (3) holds.
(ii) Suppose u / ∈ sc(n − eu). Then u / ∈ sc(n) = sc(n − eu) and
F
w
u (n − e
u) = F
w
u (n) = 0, F
w
s (n − e
u) = F
w
s (n) for s ∈ T \ {u}.
So (3) holds with equalities.
(iii) Suppose u / ∈ sc(n) and u ∈ sc(n−eu), hence sc(n−eu) = sc(n)∪{u}.
Let u ∈ Cr.
If r < `(n), then r = `(n − eu) and Cr ∩ sc(n − eu) = {u}. Thus
F w
u (n − eu) = 1 ≥ F w
u (n), F w
s (n − eu) = 0 ≤ F w
s (n), so (3) holds.
If r > `(n), then (3) holds with equalities, because `(n) = `(n − eu),
sc(n) ∩ C`(n) = sc(n − eu) ∩ C`(n−eu).
If r = `(n), then `(n − eu) = `(n), so F w
u (n − eu) < F w
u (n) because X
{w
`(n)









s (n−eu) = F w
s (n) = 0 for s ∈ T \{u}, so also now (3) holds. 2
3 Multi–glove games
We assign in this section to a multi–glove market a cooperative game and
discuss how some classical solution concepts look like for such multi–glove
games.
First we recall that a cooperative game is a pair < N,v >, where N =
{1,2,...,n} is the set of players and v : 2N → IR is the worth function
assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N, the worth v(S) with the assumption that
v(φ) = 0. The imputation set I(v) is the set of individual rational allocations
of the worth of the grand coalition, so




xi = v(N), xi ≥ v({i}) for each i ∈ N}.















The τ-value τ(v) (cf. Tijs, 1981) for a game < N,v > with non-empty core
is the feasible compromise between the marginal vector M(v) ∈ IR
n and the
minimum right vector m(v) ∈ IR
n, i.e., τ(v) = αM(v) + (1 − α)m(v), where











, for each i∈N,




The nucleolus η(v) (cf. Schmeidler, 1969) for a game < N,v > with non-
empty imputation set is the (unique) imputation which lexicographically min-
imizes the vector of non-increasingly ordered excesses of coalitions over the
imputation set, i.e.,
η = η(v) ∈ I(v) and E(η) lex E(y) for all y ∈ I(v),
where E(x) := [ ...,e(S,x) := v(S) −
X
i∈S
xi,... | S ⊂ N] is the vector of
coalitional excesses, ordered such that e(S,x) ≥ e(S0,x) whenever from left
to right the excess of S preceeds the excess of S0, and where lex denotes the
usual lexicographic ordering of vectors.
Now let (n1,n2,...,nt) ∈ IN
t be an mg-market, where N1 = {1,2,...,n1}
is the set of agents of type 1, N2 = {n1+1,n1+2,...,n1+n2} the set of agents












multi–glove game < N,v > is given by N =
t [
s=1
Ns and for each S ⊂ N,
v(S) = min{|S ∩ N1|,|S ∩ N2|,...,|S ∩ Nt|}, (4)
(where |R| is the number of elements in set R). Observe that v(N) = p(n).
8The imputation set, core, τ-value, and nucleolus of a multi–glove game
are discussed in the next two theorems.
Theorem 3. Let (n1,n2,...,nt) ∈ IN
t be a multi–glove market with corre-
sponding multi–glove game < N,v > . Then
(i) I(v) = conv{p(n)ei | i ∈ N}. (Here ei is the i-th basis vector in IR
n.)




αs ≥ 0 for each s and αs = 0, if s / ∈ sc(n), and where [α1,α2,...,αt] is
a short hand for the vector x in IR
n with xi = αs for each s ∈ T and
i ∈ Ns.
Remark 1. The imputation set of a multi–glove game is a simplex in IR
n
whose extreme points are those allocations where one player obtains the
whole worth of the grand coalition N. Core elements are imputations where
players of the same type get the same share and players of a non–scarce type
get nothing.










= conv{v(N)ei | i ∈ N}.





αs = 1 and αu = 0 if












αsv(N) = v(N). For














v(R). So x ∈ C(v). Conversely, let z ∈ C(v). We have to prove that there





βt = 1 and βs = 0
if s / ∈ sc(n). Let us call a coalition S ∈ 2N a simple coalition if it consists of
t players, all of a diﬀerent type.
For each simple coalition S we have
X
i∈S
zi ≥ v(S) = 1. Take one of the
many systems consisting of p(n) disjoint simple coalitions, say S1,...,Sp(n).























zi = 1 for each simple coalition S. Similarly, since each non–scarce
player is left out from at least one such family, we have zi = 0 for each
non–scarce player i. Finally, let s ∈ sc(n) and let k,` ∈ Ns. We claim that







zi = 1 it follows that zk = z`.
Now let βs = zi for each s ∈ T and some i ∈ Ns. Then z corresponds to
[β1,β2,...,βt]. 2
Theorem 4. Let < N,v > be the mg-game corresponding to the mg-market
n ∈ IN
t. Then for the τ-value τ(v) and nucleolus η(v) the following holds:
(i) τi(v) = |sc(n)|−1 for r ∈ sc(n) and i ∈ Nr, and τi(v) = 0 otherwise.
(ii) τ(v) = η(v)
(iii) The τ-value and the nucleolus, restricted to mg–games, are the only
rules which assign to each such a game a core element with coordinates
the same for all players of a scarce type and coordinates zero for the
players of a non–scarce type.
Proof. (i) Note that Mi(v) = 1 for each i∈Nr with r∈sc(n), and Mi(v) = 0
for the other players. We consider two subcases corresponding to |sc(n)| = 1
and |sc(n)| > 1. Suppose that |sc(n)| = 1 and sc(n) = {r}, hence v(S) =
|S ∩ Nr|. Then for i / ∈ Nr and i ∈ S we have v(S) −
X
j∈S\{i}
Mj(v) ≤ v(S) −
X
j∈S∩Nr
Mj(v) ≤ 0, which implies that mi(v) = v({i}) = 0 and also Mi(v) = 0.
For i ∈ Nr and S 3 i : v(S) −
X
j∈S\{i}
Mj(v) ≤ v(S) − (v(S) − 1) = 1 and for




Mj(v)=1. Hence, mi(v) = Mi(v) = 1 for i ∈ Nr and r ∈ sc(n).
This implies that τ(v) = αM(v) + (1 − α)m(v) = M(v); so τi(v) = Mi(v) =
101 = |sc(n)|−1 for i scarce, and τi(v) = Mi(v) = 0 for i non-scarce. Suppose
secondly that |sc(n)| > 1. If v(S) = 0, then v(S) −
X
j∈S\{i}
Mj(v) ≤ 0. A
coalition S with v(S) > 0 contains at least v(S) players of each scarce type.
So for each i ∈ S we get v(S) −
X
j∈S\{i}
Mj(v) ≤ v(S) − |sc(n)|v(S) + 1 ≤ 0.
This implies that mi(v) = v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N. Hence, τ(v) = αM(v)
with α = |sc(n)|−1.
(ii) Let B denote the collection of single-player and of simple coalitions.
It immediately follows from (4) that for each S / ∈ 2N \ B there is a non-
trivial partition R of S such that R ⊆ B and v(S) =
P
R∈R v(R). That is,
the coalitions not in B are all inessential in the mg-game v. It was proved
by Huberman (1980) that in general, if a collection B contains all essential
coalitions in a game with a nonempty core then the nucleolus is the (unique)
core-allocation which lexicographically minimizes over the core the restricted
vector EB(x) := [ ...,e(S,x),... | S ∈ B] of non-increasingly ordered ex-
cesses of coalitions taken only from B, i.e.,
η = η(v) ∈ C(v) and EB(η) lex EB(y) for all y ∈ C(v).
By Theorem 3 (ii), for each simple coalition S and for each non-scarce player
j we have e(S,z) = e({j},z) = 0 for all z ∈ C(v). Thus, in EB(.) the cor-
responding coordinates are constant over the core, so the nucleolus is actu-
ally determined by the coordinates associated with the single-player coali-
tions of the scarce players. That is, the nucleolus is the core-allocation
which lexicographically minimizes over the core the further-restricted vec-
tor [ ...,e({i},x) = −xi,... | i ∈ Nr,r ∈ sc(n)] of non-increasingly or-




xi = p(n) that only the uniform distribution achieves the lexico-
graphical minimum, so ηi(v) = |sc(n)|−1 for r ∈ sc(n) and i ∈ Nr, and
ηi(v) = 0 otherwise. Therefore, by (i), η(v) = τ(v).
(iii) follows directly from (i), (ii) and Theorem 3. 2
Remark 2. Let us make some geometric observations following from the
two preceding theorems, where we deal with a game < N,v > corresponding
to the mg-market n ∈ IN
t. For each r ∈ sc(n) we can consider the simplex






The core C(v) of the game < N,v > equals the convex hull of these
barycenters i.e. C(v) = conv{br | r ∈ sc(n)}, so the core is also a simplex.
The barycenter of the core equals the τ-value and the nucleolus: τ(v) =
η(v) = |sc(n)|−1 X
r∈sc(n)
b
r. The following example may be illustrative.
Example 4. Let < N,v > be the game corresponding to the multi-glove
market n = (2,2,3).
Then N = {1,2,...,7} and I(v) = conv{2ei | i ∈ N}. Further sc(n) =
{1,2}, I1(v) = conv{2e1,2e2} ⊂ I(v), I2(v) = conv{2e3,2e4} ⊂ I(v), b1(v) =
e1 + e2, b2(v) = e3 + e4, and C(v) = {(α1,α1,α2,α2,0,0,0) ∈ IR
7
+ | α1 +



















4 Type monotonic allocation schemes
for multi-glove games
In the following for a game < N,v > also its subgames < S,v > play a
role. Here S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and v : 2S → IR is the restriction of v : 2N → IR
to the set 2S of subcoalitions of S. Special attention is paid to so–called
allocation schemes, which assign to a game and its subgames a collection
of payoﬀ vectors, one for each subgame. Such an allocation scheme can be
denoted by [xS
i ]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S, where xS = (xS
i )i∈S ∈ IR
S. Such a scheme can be
seen as a (defect) matrix with n columns corresponding to the players and
2n−1 rows corresponding to the coalitions. An allocation scheme for a game
< N,v > is called stable if for each S ∈ 2N \{∅} the vector xS is an element
of the core of the subgame < S,v >, which core we denote here by C(S,v).
So C(v) = C(N,v).
In the literature one ﬁnds stable allocation schemes with special mono-
tonicity properties. Sprumont (1990) studied for totally balanced games
< N,v > population monotonic allocation schemes [xS
i ]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S where
xS ∈ C(S,v) for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and where for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, i ∈ S,
j ∈ N \ S : x
S∪{j}
i ≥ xS
i . So a player i gets a better payoﬀ in the larger
12coalition S ∪ {j} than in S. In Brˆ anzei et al. (2001) for total big boss game
< N,v > with player 1 as big boss bi–monotonic allocation schemes (bi-mas)
[xS
i ]S∈BN,i∈S were introduced, where BN = {S ∈ 2N | 1 ∈ S}, xS ∈ C(S,v)







1. So in such a scheme the big boss is not worse oﬀ in a larger
coalition and the other players are not better oﬀ. Sprumont proved that for
convex games each core element x ∈ C(N,v) is extendable to a population
monotonic allocation scheme [xS
i ]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S, where xN = x. Further, if xS
is the Shapley value of < S,v > then [xS]S∈2N\{∅} is a population monotonic
allocation scheme for the convex game < N,v > . For total big boss games
also each core element is bi-mas extendable and the τ-value applied to the
subgames containing the big boss generates a bi-mas (cf. Brˆ anzei et al.,
2001).
The objective of this section is to introduce a new sort of stable mono-
tonic allocation schemes for the class of multi–glove games with type set
T.
Note ﬁrst that for a multi–glove game < N,v > corresponding to the
mg-market < T,N1,N2,...,Nt >, the subgame < S,v > with S ∈ 2N \ {∅}
corresponds to the submarket < T,N1 ∩ S,N2 ∩ S,...,Nt ∩ S > if v(S) 6= 0.
So non–trivial subgames of an mg-game are also mg-games.
We are interested only in allocation schemes for mg-games with special
properties. First we want that such an allocation scheme assigns to the non–
trivial subcoalitions core elements of the subgame, which implies according
to Theorem 3 that in the subgame players of the same type obtain the same
payoﬀ, and non-scarce players in the subgame obtain zero. Secondly, we
want that the allocation scheme is type distribution consistent i.e. if for
two subgames < S1,v > and < S2,v > we have |S1 ∩ Ns| = |S2 ∩ Ns| for
each s ∈ T, then, for each s ∈ T, the allocation scheme assigns to players
of type s in both subgames the same. This implies that such an allocation











and n = (|N1|,|N2|,...,|Nt|). For a non-
trivial coalition S ∈ 2N with positive type distribution vector t(S) = (|N1 ∩
S|,...,|Nt ∩ S|), αn
u(t(S)) is the payoﬀ assigned to players of type u in S.
Note that n = t(N).
13Now we come to our main notion.
Deﬁnition 1. A type monotonic allocation scheme for an mg-game < N,v >
with type set T and type distribution vector n = t(N) is a map αn : {m ∈
IN
t | m ≤ n} → ∆ with the following two properties:
(Stability) αn
s(m) = 0 for each m ≤ n and s ∈ T \ sc(m).
(Type monotonicity) For all m ∈ IN






u(m) for each u ∈ T \{s}.
So a type monotonic allocation scheme has the property that in case a
player leaves a coalition, in the new core element of the remaining coalition
the players of the same type as the player who left are not worse oﬀ and the
others are not better oﬀ than in the old core element.
We illustrate this notion with two examples.
Example 5. Let < N,v > be the 5-person game with N1 = {1}, N2 = {2,3},
and N3 = {4,5}. Then assigning to each non–trivial subgame the τ-value































where the columns correspond to the types 1,2,3 and the rows to the type
distribution vectors of the non–trivial subcoalitions. In < N \ {2},v > the




and the players of types 1 and 3 are not better oﬀ
1
2
< 1,0 = 0

.
It turns out (Theorem 5) that the τ-value and the nucleolus generate for
each mg-game a type monotonic allocation scheme. Also other weighted allo-
cation schemes for mg-markets generate type monotonic allocation schemes
for mg-games as we see in Example 6 and Theorem 5.




3,0),(0,0,1)) to the type vectors of the game and the

































Take an arbitrary weighted allocation rule F w for mg-markets, where
w = (w1,w2,...). Then for each mg-game < N,v >, the vector F w(t(N)) is
a core element for < N,v >. This together with Theorem 2 implies that
αw : {m ∈ IN
n | m ≤ t(N)} → ∆ with αw(m) = F w(m) for each m is a type
monotonic allocation scheme for the mg-game < N,v >. The weight system
(w1) with w1 = t−1(e1 +e2 +···+et) corresponds to α(w1) and α(w1) assigns
to each subgame its τ-value (or nucleolus). So we have proved the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. Let < N,v > be an mg-game with type set T.
(i) For each hierarchical weight system w, αw : {m ∈ IN
t | m ≤ t(N)} →
IR
t
+ is a type monotonic allocation scheme for < N,v > .
(ii) An allocation scheme for < N,v >, which assigns to each subgame the
τ-value (or the nucleolus) is a type monotonic allocation scheme.
The following theorem implies that each core element z of an mg-game
< N,v > is extendable to a type monotonic allocation scheme, where the
element assigned to < N,v > corresponds to z.
Theorem 6. Let z ∈ C(N,v) and t(N) ∈ IN
t. Then there is a hierarchical
weight system w such that αw(t(N)) = z.
Proof. Construct the vector w1 ∈ IR
t
+ as follows. For each type s ∈ T
take an i ∈ Ns and put w1
s = zi. If carr(w1) = T, then take w = (w1). If
carr(w1) 6= T, take as weight system w = (w1,w2), where w2 is an arbitrarily
chosen vector w2 ∈ IR
T
+, with the properties that carr(w2) = T \carr(w1) and
15that the sum of the coordinates is 1. Then αw
s (t(N)) = zi for each i ∈ Ns.
So αw(t(N)) corresponds to the core element z of < N,v > and αw is a type
monotonic allocation scheme which ’extends’ z. 2
Example 7. Let < N,v > be the 4-person mg-game with N1 = {1,2}
and N2 = {3,4}. Then z = (1,1,0,0) ∈ C(N,v), which corresponds to
αw(2,2), where w = (w1,w2) with w1 = (1,0) and w2 = (0,1). Note that
αw(2,2) = αw(1,2) = αw(1,1) = (1,0), αw(2,1) = (0,1).
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